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Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health
Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol
Consumption?
Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann
ABSTRACT
A model of addiction in which individuals are forward looking implies that as the availability
of addiction treatment options grows, individuals will consume more of an addictive good.
We test this implication using cross-state variation in the adoption of mental health parity
mandates that include substance abuse treatments. We examine the effects of these mandates
on the consumption of alcohol and find that parity legislation leads to an increase in alcohol
consumption. To account for the possible endogeneity of the adoption of mental health parity
mandates, we perform an instrumental variables analysis and find that the ordinary least
squares estimation significantly underestimates the insurance effect on alcohol consumption.
1. INTRODUCTION
To combat the large and seemingly growing problem of mental illness
in the United States, most states enacted mental health parity legislation
in the 1980s and 1990s.1 The enacted legislation at the state level man-
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1. Actually, policymakers and scholars worldwide have increased the attention paid
to the effects of mental illness. The Global Burden of Disease study conducted by the World
Health Organization, the World Bank, and Harvard University estimates that mental illness
accounts for more than 15 percent of the burden of disease in the developed world. This
fraction is greater than the share of disease that is attributable to all forms of cancer
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dates that treatments for mental illness be covered by insurance plans
at terms similar to those applying to physical illness. Although the spe-
cifics of the mandates vary from state to state, the strongest mental health
parity laws require that health plans set the same deductibles and co-
payments, as well as annual expense and visit limits, for mental health
patients as for patients with physical health conditions.2
In this paper, we study whether the availability of addiction treat-
ments, which lower the cost of the addiction itself, affects an individual’s
choice regarding current consumption of an addictive good. We use the
adoption of state parity laws to test the hypothesis regarding the effect
of subsidies on addictive behavior, focusing on alcohol consumption,
comparing the changes in drinking from adopting states’ prelaw baseline
to the contemporaneous changes in drinking in states that do not adopt
parity laws.
We find that drinking does rise after parity laws are passed. Since
unobserved variables might simultaneously determine changes in drink-
ing behavior and the adoption of the parity laws, we control for the
potential endogeneity of parity adoption through instrumental variables
analysis. We show that failing to control for this simultaneity biases
downward the effect of parity mandates on drinking. The empirical
results suggest that individuals react rationally to changes in incentives,
providing support for models that imply that individuals do consider
the costs of their behavior when deciding to consume addictive goods.
From a public policy perspective, our results imply that providing in-
surance coverage for mental disorders in general, and addiction in par-
ticular, has unintended consequences. Unintended consequences may
arise owing to moral hazards and offsetting behaviors. In particular,
parity mandates might induce individuals to alter their behavior in such
a way as to increase the demand for mental health treatments.
In Section 2 of this paper, we provide some background on mental
health parity laws. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the implications of
both the rational addiction model of Gary Becker, Michael Grossman,
and Kevin Murphy and the hyperbolic discounting model of Jonathan
combined (Murray and Lopez 1996). The Global Burden of Disease study highlights al-
coholism as one form of mental illness and finds that in the developed world, alcohol use
is the leading cause of disability among men and the tenth leading cause among women.
2. The mandates also vary in terms of what illnesses are covered under mental health
parity, with some mandates including any disorder listed in the American Psychiatric As-
sociation’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, while others cover only specified diseases.
Further, many states provide exemptions for small businesses or those for whom the man-
dated coverage terms would lead to a specified cost increase.
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Gruber and Botond Köszegi for the provision of addiction insurance. In
Section 4, we present the empirical model that tests the insured addiction
model. Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. MENTAL HEALTH PARITY BACKGROUND
Medical insurance plans tend to provide less coverage for mental illnesses
than for physical illnesses. Buck and Umland (1997), for example, find
that while health care costs per employee grew from 1989 to 1995,
mental health care costs decreased in absolute terms and as a fraction
of employers’ total medical plan expenses. Jensen et al. (1998) find that
while the proportion of employees with mental health care coverage
increased over the period 1991–95, coverage came with significant lim-
itations for most. Buck et al. (1999) report that restrictions on mental
health coverage were substantial for most individuals as of 1997.
Market failures might provide an explanation for the difference in
terms between mental health and physical health coverage. That is, there
is empirical evidence that both moral hazard and adverse-selection prob-
lems are more acute for mental health insurance than for physical health
insurance. For example, researchers involved in the Rand Health Insur-
ance Experiment estimated that the response to reduced cost sharing for
mental health services is nearly twice as large as that observed in general
medical care (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993).
Similarly, mental health disorders appear to lead to substantial
adverse-selection problems, as indicated by the experience of the Federal
Employees Health Benefit Program in the 1970s. In that case, one of
the available providers (Aetna) offered a parity benefit while the other
(Blue Cross) did not. Aetna immediately attracted a higher risk pool of
enrollees, which resulted in financial losses on the coverage. Aetna even-
tually dropped the parity option (McGuire 1981).
While parity mandates may give rise to moral hazard and adverse
selection, some work points to evidence that the direct costs of parity
mandates to employers are considerably lower than had been presumed,
since these costs may be offset by improvements in worker health and
in productivity gains. Sturm (1997), for example, estimates that the cost
figures used during the federal government’s 1996 analysis of mental
health parity were overstated by a factor of four to eight. According to
his analysis, removing annual limits on mental health care expenses
would cost an insurance plan an extra $1 per enrollee per year on av-
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erage. The Congressional Budget Office (2001) estimates that imple-
mentation of the Senate’s version of mental health parity would increase
premiums for group health plans by an average of only .9 percent. Re-
sults presented in Gruber (1994) suggest that insurance mandates might
do little to improve access to treatment.3 These results imply that cost
increases associated with parity laws are likely to be low.
Other work suggests that mandatory provision of mental illness cov-
erage reduces other costs borne by employers. England (1999), for ex-
ample, claims that employers lost $24 billion in 1993 owing to lost work
time and productivity as a result of untreated depression among their
employees. Olfson, Sing, and Schlesinger (1999) note that the indirect
cost savings that occur when mental illness is covered by insurance might
be particularly important with respect to treatments for alcoholism. They
cite evidence that early treatment of the disorder can eliminate many of
the health costs that are associated with alcoholism, such as cirrhosis,
cardiomyopathy, and chronic hepatic encephalopathy.4
While academic work on health parity laws has studied the costs and
benefits of mental health parity, it has not examined the potential in-
crease in indirect costs due to moral hazard. Studies have not examined
the possibility that parity mandates might induce individuals to alter
their behavior in such a way as to increase the demand for mental health
treatments. This paper addresses that issue.
Our determination of whether a state has a mental health parity law
is based on information provided by the National Conference of State
Legislatures, as well as an independent analysis of state insurance statutes
and regulations. Our search of the states’ statutes resulted in a somewhat
different classifications than those provided by a number of mental
health advocacy groups such as the National Alliance for the Mentally
Ill and the National Mental Health Association. Although much previous
research, such as Sturm and Pacula (1999), relies on the classifications
provided by these advocacy groups, there appear to be inconsistencies
among the various classifications, as well as with the original statutory
3. Klick and Markowitz (forthcoming) present indirect evidence of this for mental
health mandates in particular.
4. Other costs associated with alcohol consumption include an increase in suicide
(Chatterji et al. 2004), poor labor market outcomes (Mullahy and Sindelar 1993, 1996),
higher assault rates (Markowitz 2005), domestic violence (Markowitz 2000), higher in-
cidence of sexually transmitted diseases (Klick and Stratmann 2003), and an increase in
automobile fatalities (Levitt and Porter 2001).
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language passed by the state legislatures themselves.5 Even though our
primary results are robust to using any of the classifications, we believe
that our reliance on the original statutes has resulted in a more accurate
coding of the various laws and that this improvement in accuracy has
also improved the precision of our estimates.
While most states have passed some form of parity mandate, there
is a wide variation with respect to the timing of the parity adoption.
Thus, it is a natural question to ask what determines whether and when
a state will adopt a parity mandate. Sturm and Pacula (1999), for ex-
ample, indicate that states with relatively low utilization rates of mental
health services were more likely to pass mandates. Looking specifically
at mandates that explicitly include coverage for substance abuse, it ap-
pears that there are also significant political determinants involved in
the adoption of mental health parity laws.
Table 1 describes the states that have adopted mental health parity
legislation. In this paper we analyze data from the 1988–98 period,
during which 10 states adopted parity mandates that explicitly include
substance abuse and three states adopted laws that explicitly exclude
substance abuse.
5. For example, Sturm and Pacula (1999, p. 186) present a chart describing the Na-
tional Alliance for the Mentally Ill’s classification of state parity laws, in which Tennessee’s
law is said to exclude substance abuse. While Tennessee’s statutory code (Tenn. Code Ann.,
sec. 56-7-2601(a)) does appear to allow insurance plans to limit coverage for substance
abuse (“All other provisions of the laws of the state of Tennessee notwithstanding, any
individual, franchise, blanket or group policy of insurance issued pursuant to this title
which provides hospital expense and surgical expense insurance and which is entered into,
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed [excepting individual insurance policy renewal]
by agreement or otherwise, commencing on July 1, 1974, shall provide benefits for expense
of residents of the state of Tennessee covered under any such policy or plan, arising from
psychiatric disorders, mental or nervous conditions [as described and defined in the Di-
agnostic Standard Manual of the American Psychiatric Association], alcoholism, drug de-
pendence [both defined as mental illness in sec. 33-1-101], or the medical complication of
mental illness or mental retardation, unless the policy or plan of insurance specifically
excludes or reduces the above benefits” [emphasis added]), the last line of the subsection
(“the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to group policies or plans to which sec.
56-7-2360 applies”) implies that this possibility is precluded by the state’s parity statute.
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Table 1. Mental Health Parity Laws
Law Explicitly Includes
Substance Abuse
Law Does Not Explicitly
Exclude Substance Abuse
Law Explicitly Excludes
Substance Abuse
Connecticut (2000) Alabama (2001) Arizona (1998)
Georgia (1998) Arkansas (1997) Colorado (1992)
Kansas (1998) California (1974) Texas (1997)
Louisiana (1982) Delaware (1999)
Maryland (1994) Florida (1992)
Michigan (2001) Hawaii (1988)
Minnesota (1995) Illinois (1991)
Mississippi (1975) Indiana (2000)
Missouri (1997) Kentucky (1987)
Montana (1997) Maine (1996)
New York (1998) Massachusetts (1996)
North Dakota (1995) Nebraska (2000)
Ohio (1985) Nevada (2000)
Oregon (2000) New Hampshire (1993)
Rhode Island (2001) New Jersey (1999)
South Carolina (1994) New Mexico (2000)
Vermont (1998) Oklahoma (2000)
Virginia (2000) Pennsylvania (1999)
Rhode Island (1995)
South Dakota (1998)
Tennessee (2000)
Utah (2001)
Washington (1987)
West Virginia (1998)
Note. The year of adoption is in parentheses.
3. INSURED ADDICTION
Becker and Murphy (1988) analyze the implications of rational choice
in the presence of addictive goods.6 They show that an individual might
rationally choose to consume an addictive good if the present value of
doing so is sufficiently high as to outweigh the expected costs of addic-
tion. Their model represents a distinct departure from a myopic view
of addiction (see, for example, Pollak 1970) in which the individual does
not fully consider the future costs of his present consumption.7
6. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) model has important antecedents in the literature,
including Ryder and Heal (1973), Stigler and Becker (1977), Boyer (1978, 1983), and
Iannaccone (1986).
7. Arcidiacono, Sieg, and Sloan (2001) present a dynamic discrete-choice model that
allows myopia as a special case of a general forward-looking model. They use their model
to forecast drinking and smoking rates in a different sample, showing that the forward-
looking model dominates myopia as a descriptive model.
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A long line of empirical testing of the rational addiction literature
was begun by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994).8 In that paper,
the dynamic rational addiction model was adapted to allow for empirical
testing of the theory using variation in the past and future prices of
cigarettes to explain current cigarette consumption. The model has since
been applied in several studies to explain consumption patterns of nu-
merous addictive goods including cocaine (Grossman and Chaloupka
1998), gambling (Mobilia 1993), and alcohol (Grossman, Chaloupka,
and Sirtalan 1998), all of which found support for the key hypotheses
of the rational addiction model.9
In the Becker, Grossman, and Murphy framework, the effect of in-
cluding insurance covering addiction treatment is obvious. Addiction
insurance effectively lowers the future cost of current consumption of
an addictive good. Included in an individual’s expectations about the
cost of becoming addicted are things such as increased difficulty in hold-
ing a job or maintaining a family, maintaining a threshold level of con-
sumption in the face of unexpected price increases, or health costs as-
sociated with long-term consumption. Subsidized addiction treatment
lowers the expected future cost of current consumption since treatment
will make it easier to avoid these other costs in the event that an addiction
develops.
A recent challenger to the rational addiction model has been proposed
by Gruber and Köszegi (2001), who assume time-inconsistent prefer-
ences, which is a departure from the standard rational addiction model.
A key feature of time-inconsistent preferences in the addiction context,
according to Gruber and Köszegi, is systematically overestimating the
ability to quit or reduce consumption in the future. This failure to ac-
curately price the costs of addiction causes the individual to consume
too much of the addictive good in the current period, discounting future
costs of addiction because of a belief that he or she will be able to
overcome the addiction relatively easily. In a sense, the current self im-
poses an “internality” on the future self through the mistaken expec-
tations regarding the efficacy of treatment. The presence of addiction
insurance will reinforce that belief. Thus, as long as the individual is
8. A few earlier papers (Chaloupka 1991; Keeler et al. 1993) had used the model to
examine cigarette addiction, although they had slightly less effect on subsequent literature.
9. Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide an overview of the empirical literature on
rational addiction. Pacula and Chaloupka (2001) show that consumption decisions for
addictive goods are affected by changes in nominal prices and implicit prices (such as
penalties for consuming illegal substances).
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forward looking, the expectation of addiction insurance subsidies will
increase current consumption of an addictive good, regardless of whether
time-consistent or time-inconsistent preferences are assumed.10
4. EMPIRICAL TEST
The best test of the insured addiction model would be generated from
an exogenous assignment of insurance to some group of individuals,
who would constitute the treatment group; those individuals without
this assignment would constitute the control group. If individuals self-
select on the basis of insurance status, as is typical in most publicly
available data, unobservable characteristics that influence the decision
to purchase insurance might also influence consumption decisions. This
would not allow us to isolate the causal effect of future insurance cov-
erage on current consumption of addictive goods.
States that adopt a mental health parity law, however, provide a quasi
experiment if these laws provide insured individuals in that state with
an exogenous increase in insurance coverage (that is, effectively cheaper
treatment opportunities).11 We use this shock to identify the effect of
cheaper treatment options in the future on the decision to consume
addictive goods currently. Since we focus on alcohol addiction, we an-
alyze the effect of mental health parity mandates that include coverage
for addiction treatments on alcohol consumption. Extending the models
of addiction described above to include a treatment option leads to a
prediction of a positive relationship between adoption of the mandates
and alcohol consumption.
However, there is the possibility that the parity laws were passed
because voters had preferences for more (or less) current drinking and
for having alcohol addiction treatment made cheaper to individuals by
having it covered by medical insurance. We will address this possible
endogeneity of the laws with respect to drinking decisions later in this
paper.
10. It is interesting to note that Gruber and Köszegi’s (2001) model and results also
imply forward-looking behavior in an individual’s decision to consume addictive goods.
11. For those individuals who already received mental health benefits, the mandates
have the effect of making coverage more certain, since employers or insurers no longer
have the option of dropping such coverage. Further, if the individual was forced to switch
insurers (for example, in the case of changing jobs), the coverage will still be available.
For those with coverage, the mandates most likely would have eased some restrictions those
individuals faced in their coverage.
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Using a panel of per capita beer consumption12 for each state for the
period 1988–9813 as the dependent variable, we use weighted least
squares estimation14 to examine the effect of the parity legislation on
consumption of the addictive good. Although our primary results are
robust for wine and spirits, we focus on beer consumption as our mea-
sure of drinking because of evidence that beer is the primary choice of
individuals on the verge of developing an alcohol addiction, at least in
recent years.15 Further, previous researchers have developed more con-
sistent measures of state beer taxes than they have for either wine or
spirits. In addition, we control for a number of covariates that may be
important for explaining alcohol consumption.
The parity indicator is an indicator variable that takes the value of
one if a state has adopted a mental health parity mandate for a given
year. We focus on those states whose mental health parity laws explicitly
cover treatment for addiction or substance abuse. Our control group
includes states that have not adopted a mental health parity law, states
whose parity laws do not mention substance abuse and addiction, and
states whose mental health parity laws explicitly exclude alcohol addic-
tion. In this set of regressions, we predict that the adoption of the parity
law that includes mandatory treatment for alcohol addiction leads to a
positive and statistically significant increase in alcohol consumption. We
also provide separate estimates in which we use the states that adopted
a parity mandate but explicitly excluded the coverage of substance abuse
as a separate control group. In this set of regressions, we predict that
adoption of the parity laws that include mandatory coverage for treat-
ments of alcohol addiction leads to a positive and statistically significant
12. The per capita beer consumption variable is measured in gallons of ethanol con-
sumed per person per year. The figures are from are sales data, as opposed to self-reported
consumption data. Beer generally contains 4 percent alcohol by volume, so a standard 12-
ounce beer represents .48 ounces, or .00375 gallons, of ethanol. Stated differently, ap-
proximately 267 standard beers contain a gallon of ethanol.
13. We chose this period on the basis of two factors: all of the states had raised their
minimum legal drinking age to 21 by 1988 (DiNardo and Lemieux 2001), and data on
per capita alcohol sales are currently not available after 1998.
14. Since the dependent variable is a per capita figure, we weight each observation by
state population.
15. For example, Miller and Cervantes (1997) find that in a sample of problem drink-
ers, beer was more commonly the alcohol of choice for men than was wine or spirits. Using
a larger sample and regression techniques, Jensen et al. (2002) found that among moderate
drinkers, those preferring beer were more likely to become heavy drinkers than those
preferring wine or spirits. This result held for both men and women but was more pro-
nounced for men.
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increase in alcohol consumption but that the point estimate on the parity
laws that exclude alcohol addiction from mandatory treatment coverage
will not be statistically different from zero.
For covariates, the theoretical models predict that past and future
consumption influences current consumption. In some of our specifi-
cations, we substitute current and future prices for current and future
consumption because the effect of alcohol consumption in adjacent pe-
riods on current-period alcohol consumption should be entirely captured
by changes in alcohol prices (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1994).
However, as pointed out by Gruber and Köszegi (2001), future prices
should have an effect only when changes are correctly forecasted.
In all regressions, we include current alcohol prices in the alcohol
consumption equation. As previous work has done, we use real changes
in state alcohol tax rates as a measure for beer prices.16 We predict a
negative relationship between current price and current consumption
and a positive relationship between current consumption and past and
future consumption, which captures the addictive nature of alcohol con-
sumption. Given questions about individuals’ abilities to forecast tax
changes, however, we do not expect the past and future price terms to
generate statistically significant coefficients.
Also, even if individuals are good at forecasting tax changes, since
we are using data aggregated at the state level, as opposed to micro
data, it is not clear that we will find the predicted pattern in the aggre-
gated data. Since state data are averaged over individuals who are on
paths to increasing or decreasing consumption, the aggregates may not
reveal the pattern that we expect to see at the individual level. Moreover,
the predicted pattern may also be difficult to find owing to migration
to and from the state over time. Although these variables are not central
to our analysis, we will include them, as previous work has found that
consumption in adjacent periods is important in explaining current con-
sumption.
We also control for income, predicting a positive relationship between
income and alcohol consumption (that is, alcohol is a normal good). In
addition, we control for various demographic factors that influence per
capita drinking rates such as age measures, education, percentage of the
population living in rural areas, religion, and race variables. We also
control for state unemployment and the availability of counseling ser-
16. Note, however, that Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) demonstrate that taxes
might not be terribly strong predictors of alcohol prices in the short term.
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vices in the state. We use the per capita number of psychiatrists in the
state and per capita spending on mental health services to capture this
availability effect.
Since parity legislation affects only those who are insured already,
we might not expect to see any change in behavior among the uninsu-
red.17 To control for this, we include a variable that represents the frac-
tion of the state’s population that is not covered by an insurance plan.
Also, since individuals covered by Medicaid and Medicare are not af-
fected by the mandates, we also include controls for the percentage of
state population covered by each of those programs. Finally, even some
individuals who are insured by private plans will not be covered by the
mandates owing to preemption provided by the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), which precludes states from mandating
benefits for employees in firms that self-insure. While there are no com-
prehensive data on what percentage of each state’s workforce is not
affected by ERISA, a good proxy is the percentage of the workforce
employed by relatively small firms, which are less likely to be able to
self-insure. To capture this effect, we include a variable that measures
the percentage of the state’s workforce employed by firms with between
one and four employees.18
More formally, our empirical models are
E p aMHP  dP  jP  gP  QC  u  t  eit it it it1 t1 it i t it
and
E p aMHP  bMHPEA  dP  jP  gP  QC  u  t  e ,it it it it it1 t1 it i t it
which we estimate with weighted least squares regressions, where each
observation is weighted by state population. The variable measuresEit
per capita beer consumption in state i during year t, is the statusMHPit
of the parity indicator in state i during year t, is an indicatorMHPEA it
for whether the state has a parity law that explicitly excludes addiction
treatment, is state i’s beer tax in year t, is a vector of stateP QCit it
variables, is a time-invariant state fixed effect term, is a year fixedu ti t
effect term, and is a stochastic error term. As indicated above, con-eit
sumption in adjacent time periods is likely to be endogenous to current
17. However, this need not be true if the uninsured expect to become insured in the
future.
18. All results are qualitatively similar if we use higher cutoffs such as 9, 19, and 99.
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consumption, so we use past and future prices to proxy for the past and
future consumption variables, predicting negative signs on each.
Descriptive statistics and sources for these data are included in Table
2. The mean beer consumption per capita (population aged 14 years
and older) is 1.320 gallons of ethanol per year, which corresponds to
about 352 standard 12-ounce beers per year. Three percent of our state-
year observations are subject to a mandatory state health parity law that
includes coverage of alcohol addiction, and approximately 3 percent of
our observations are subject to health parity laws that specifically ex-
clude coverage of alcohol addiction.
5. RESULTS
Table 3 presents the weighted least squares estimates of our insured
addiction model. In Table 3, columns 1–3, we present specifications in
which states that have parity laws that include addiction treatments are
the treatment group and all other states are implicitly the control group;
this control includes states that have a parity law but do not mandate
addiction treatment. Columns 4–6 include states with parity laws that
exclude addiction treatment as a separate control group. Regardless of
the specification, our parity coefficient is positive, but it is not statistically
significant. The point estimate suggests that adoption of parity laws
covering addiction treatments increases per capita beer consumption by
about .02 gallons of ethanol. This increase is equivalent to an additional
five beers per person annually.
Once we introduce states with parity laws that exclude addiction
treatment as a separate control variable, we get effectively the same
coefficient on our indicator of parity laws including addiction treatment.
As predicted, the point estimates on the parity laws that excluded alcohol
addiction from mandatory treatment are not significantly different from
zero, except in the specification that includes no other control variables.
While the positive coefficients on the parity indicator lend support
to the insured rational addiction model, the lack of statistical significance
limits our ability to draw strong inferences from the data. There is the
possibility that the adoption of parity mandates is endogenous in the
alcohol consumption equation.19 In this case, the point estimates on the
19. For a good review of the literature on the endogeneity of political institutions, see
Besley and Case (2003).
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parity laws are biased, and the adoption of parity laws no longer serves
as a good measure for increased insurance coverage.
The coefficient on the parity laws may have an upward or downward
bias. If adoption of the measure is positively influenced by expected
increases in drinking rates, states will adopt mandatory treatment laws
when they expect increases in alcohol addiction. In this example, state
governments act proactively by ensuring coverage when they expect an
increase in drinking problems, and the point estimate has an upward
bias. Also, voters may push for treatment insurance coverage when their
preferences change toward consuming more alcohol. Endogeneity of this
kind also biases the parity coefficients upward.
Alternatively, voters with a preference for little or no alcohol con-
sumption in the state might wish to further reduce alcohol consumption
and possible addiction by passage of parity laws. Legislators may be
induced to pass mandatory mental health insurance in such states since
these states have little alcohol consumption, and thus little demand for
treatment to begin with; parity laws in these situations are unlikely to
impose very large costs on employers. In this context, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) point estimates of the effect of parity laws are biased
downward.
To allow for the possibility of endogenous parity laws, we perform
an instrumental variables analysis in which we instrument the parity
mandate indicator with variables that are unlikely to be related to beer
consumption.20 For the identification strategy to be successful, we must
select instruments that affect the adoption of parity mandates but do
not affect beer consumption (except through their effect on parity adop-
tion).21
For our instruments, we choose an indicator variable that captures
whether the state has enacted a mandate requiring insurers to cover
diabetes treatments, an indicator variable that captures whether the state
20. The parity mandate indicator is estimated in the first stage as a linear probability
model. Although it might seem as though it would be better to estimate the indicator using
a probit model, this would require calculating a maximum-likelihood function that included
the state and year fixed effects, which would be computationally difficult. The other option
of demeaning all of the variables, to allow us to ignore the fixed effects terms, would bias
the standard error estimates. Using the linear probability model in the first stage avoids
these problems and allows us to estimate the causal effect of the treatment consistently
and efficiently (Angrist 2000). For an earlier application of the linear probability model
for endogenous regressors, see Heckman and MaCurdy (1985).
21. For a good discussion of instrumental variables techniques, as well as the conditions
required for having a good instrument, see Angrist and Krueger (2001).
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Table 3. Weighted Least Squares Estimation Relating Parity to Beer Consumption
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parity with Alcohol .002
(.017)
.023
(.013)
.023
(.013)
.004
(.017)
.023
(.013)
.023
(.013)
Parity Excluding Alcohol . . . . . . . . . .042
(.013)
.007
(.010)
.006
(.010)
Beer Tax . . . .234
(.053)
.395
(.174)
. . . .234
(.053)
.394
(.174)
Beer Taxt1 . . . . . . .045
(.109)
. . . . . . .044
(.109)
Beer Taxt1 . . . . . . .139
(.137)
. . . . . . .139
(.137)
Personal Income . . . .032
(.006)
.031
(.006)
. . . .032
(.006)
.032
(.006)
Uninsured . . . .000
(.001)
.000
(.001)
. . . .000
(.001)
.000
(.001)
Secondary Education . . . .005
(.002)
.005
(.002)
. . . .005
(.002)
.005
(.002)
Population 15 to 19 .003
(.011)
.003
(.011)
. . . .002
(.011)
.002
(.011)
Population 20 to 29 . . . .006
(.005)
.006
(.005)
. . . .006
(.005)
.006
(.005)
Black Population . . . .016
(.007)
.016
(.007)
. . . .016
(.007)
.016
(.007)
Unemployment . . . .001
(.002)
.001
(.002)
. . . .001
(.002)
.001
(.002)
Rural . . . .003
(.002)
.003
(.002)
. . . .004
(.002)
.003
(.002)
Small Business . . . .053
(.008)
.053
(.008)
. . . .054
(.009)
.054
(.009)
Medicaid . . . .001
(.001)
.001
(.001)
. . . .001
(.001)
.001
(.001)
Medicare . . . .017
(.008)
.018
(.008)
. . . .017
(.008)
.018
(.008)
Psychiatrists . . . .000
(.002)
.000
(.002)
. . . .000
(.002)
.000
(.002)
Mental Health Spending . . . .002
(.003)
.002
(.003)
. . . .002
(.003)
.002
(.003)
Religion . . . .007
(.001)
.007
(.002)
. . . .007
(.001)
.007
(.002)
Adjusted R2 .941 .975 .975 .942 .975 .975
Observations 612 599 599 612 599 599
Note. The dependent variable is per capita (person aged 14 years and older) beer sales by
state measured in gallons of ethanol. One gallon of ethanol equals approximately 267
standard (that is, 12 ounces; 4% alcohol by volume) beers. Population weights are used.
State and year effects are included for all equations. Standard errors are in parentheses
below coefficient estimates.
has enacted caps on medical malpractice damage awards, and the num-
ber of physicians in the state (excluding psychiatrists) per capita. The
first two instruments are intended to capture the general regulatory and
legislative environment faced by insurers. If a given state has passed an
insurance mandate with respect to diabetes treatments, it would seem
likely that it is also willing to mandate coverage in the mental health
area. The argument with respect to medical malpractice reform is slightly
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less direct. Our assumption is that voters tend to view the insurance
industry as a whole and do not differentiate between property and ca-
sualty insurers (who write malpractice policies) and health insurers (who
would need to cover mental health treatments). Thus, this instrument
picks up whether voters view the insurance industry positively or neg-
atively.22 Also, to some extent, both of these instruments likely capture
the effects of any political contribution limits a state places on corpo-
rations. If the state limits corporations from making political donations,
we should expect that insurance mandates are more likely to be passed
and medical malpractice reform are less likely to be passed.
Our last instrument, physicians per capita, attempts to capture the
Sturm and Pacula (1999) finding that states whose residents have rela-
tively poor access to mental health services are more likely to pass mental
health mandates. Since availability of mental health treatment is likely
to be correlated with the number of medical professionals in a state, we
believe that this instrument will prove to be powerful. We exclude psy-
chiatrists from our physicians variable given that an increased presence
of psychiatrists in a state might directly affect drinking rates in the state.23
As shown in Table 4 and the Appendix, our instruments uniformly
capture a statistically significant part of the variation in parity laws,
since the first-stage F-statistics indicate that the instruments are individ-
ually and jointly statistically significant and the correlations run in the
directions predicted above. For the mandates that include addiction cov-
erage, we find first-stage F-statistics of about 20, which is far above the
standard cutoff for considering instruments to be good predictors of the
endogenous regressors (Staiger and Stock 1997).24
22. We find qualitatively similar results if we drop the medical malpractice reform
instrument. We choose to include it in the regressions we present here in order to be able
to perform the test of overidentifying restrictions for the specifications that include two
parity indicators.
23. There is still the concern that individuals seek treatment for depression from their
family doctors as well, which could then have an effect on the individuals’ consumption
of alcohol. We find that we get very similar results if we use the number of doctors in a
specific specialty, using those specialties that are unlikely to counsel patients regarding
depression (for example, obstetricians, surgeons, and so on) as our instrument. To further
rule out the potential that our instruments affect drinking directly, we present the results
of a test of overidentifying restrictions that indicates that our instruments do not directly
affect drinking rates.
24. Staiger and Stock (1997) discuss how, for first-stage F-statistics under 10, the
asymptotic approximations of the distributions of the major diagnostic statistics (such as
those used for tests of overidentifying restrictions) break down. Further, Angrist and Krue-
ger (2001) discuss how sets of instruments with a first-stage F-statistic less than 10 generate
Table 4. Instrumental-Variables Estimation Relating Parity to Beer Consumption
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parity with Alcohol .145
(.120)
.179
(.043)
.179
(.043)
.184
(.135)
.145
(.059)
.144
(.060)
Parity Excluding Alcohol . . . . . . . . . .054
(.074)
.081
(.095)
.080
(.095)
Beer Tax . . . .229
(.056)
.398
(.183)
. . . .230
(.056)
.378
(.184)
Beer Taxt1 . . . . . . .081
(.115)
. . . . . . .053
(.199)
Beer Taxt1 . . . . . . .108
(.144)
. . . . . . .114
(.144)
Personal Income . . . .035
(.006)
.034
(.006)
. . . .040
(.009)
.039
(.009)
Uninsured . . . .000
(.001)
.000
(.001)
. . . .001
(.002)
.001
(.002)
Secondary Education . . . .006
(.002)
.006
(.002)
. . . .004
(.003)
.004
(.003)
Population 15 to 19 . . . .022
(.013)
.022
(.013)
. . . .028
(.015)
.028
(.015)
Population 20 to 29 . . . .018
(.006)
.018
(.006)
. . . .014
(.008)
.014
(.008)
Black Population . . . .045
(.011)
.044
(.011)
. . . .040
(.012)
.039
(.012)
Unemployment . . . .001
(.002)
.000
(.002)
. . . .000
(.003)
.000
(.003)
Rural . . . .003
(.002)
.003
(.002)
. . . .006
(.003)
.006
(.003)
Small Business . . . .061
(.009)
.062
(.009)
. . . .077
(.020)
.077
(.020)
Medicaid . . . .000
(.001)
.000
(.001)
. . . .001
(.001)
.001
(.001)
Medicare . . . .017
(.008)
.017
(.008)
. . . .012
(.010)
.013
(.009)
Psychiatrists . . . .001
(.002)
.001
(.002)
. . . .002
(.002)
.002
(.002)
Mental Health Spending . . . .000
(.002)
.000
(.003)
. . . .002
(.004)
.002
(.004)
Religion . . . .003
(.002)
.004
(.002)
. . . .005
(.003)
.005
(.003)
Adjusted R2 .940 .972 .972 .932 .972 .972
Observations 600 599 599 600 599 599
First-stage F (parity,
parity no alcohol) 3.82 19.84 19.54 3.82 19.84 19.54
7.94 4.01 4.11
Overidentification testa .688
(.710)
.754
(.686)
.735
(.693)
.073
(.787)
.027
(.870)
.034
(.853)
Hausman testa 1.684
(.195)
17.018
(.000)
16.736
(.000)
1.630
(.197)
8.685
(.000)
8.530
(.000)
Note. The dependent variable is per capita (person aged 14 years and older) beer
sales by state measured in gallons of ethanol. One gallon of ethanol equals ap-
proximately 267 standard (that is, 12 ounces; 4% alcohol by volume) beers. Pop-
ulation weights are used. The instruments for the parity with alcohol and the
parity excluding alcohol variables are Medmal Cap, Diabetes Mandate, and Doc-
tors. First-stage regression results are available in the Appendix. State and year
effects are included for all equations. Standard errors are in parentheses below
coefficient estimates.
a Values in parentheses are p-values.
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After controlling for the simultaneity involved in passage of mental
health mandates, we find that passage of mandates that include addiction
treatments leads to a statistically significant increase in beer consump-
tion. Table 4 indicates that passage of an addiction mandate is associated
with an increase in ethanol consumption of .18, which is the equivalent
of about 48 extra beers per person per year. In the specifications that
control for mandates that exclude addiction treatments, we again find
no relationship between these mandates and beer consumption, and the
coefficient for mandates that include addiction treatment decreases only
slightly to .15, or 40 extra beers per person annually.
Our low Sargan overidentification test statistics imply that our in-
struments do not directly affect beer consumption. Also, the Hausman
test statistics suggest that the OLS estimates do suffer from a simultaneity
bias indicating that our instrumental variables results are consistent.
These results suggest that the adoption of mental health insurance parity
mandates that include addiction treatments are causally related to drink-
ing rates. Further, they lend support to models of addiction that assume
individuals are forward looking in their decision making.
6. CONCLUSION
The rational addiction model provides important insights into the effect
of increases in access to addiction treatment. Specifically, any model of
addiction that assumes forward-looking individuals implies that in-
creased availability of addiction treatment in the future will lead to
increased consumption of the addictive good currently. To test this im-
plication, we use the adoption of mental health parity mandates as a
natural experiment in which parity exogenously increases future treat-
ment access. We show that this increased access generates significantly
more current-period beer consumption.
The estimated effect is significantly larger when we control for the
endogeneity of parity adoption. By using factors that influence the po-
litical decisions regarding the adoption of insurance mandates, we are
able to surmount the simultaneity bias that limits the value of our OLS
estimates. Our instrumental variables results provide substantial evi-
dence that the positive relationship estimated between adoption of parity
mandates including substance abuse and alcohol sales is causal. From a
estimates of the coefficient on the endogenous regressors that are biased toward the ordinary
least squares estimate.
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theoretical viewpoint, we present the first investigation of the effect of
treatment options and insurance in the rational addiction framework.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that mental health parity
mandates generate unexpected costs through moral hazard.
APPENDIX
Table A1. First-Stage Regression Results
Parity Including Alcohol Parity Excluding Alcohol
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Medmal Cap .044
(.038)
.080
(.034)
.080
(.034)
.186
(.049)
.147
(.047)
.148
(.047)
Diabetes Mandate .061
(.021)
.050
(.019)
.050
(.019)
.023
(.027)
.012
(.026)
.010
(.026)
Doctors .001
(.000)
.003
(.000)
.003
(.000)
.001
(.000)
.001
(.001)
.001
(.001)
Note. All first-stage equations contain the covariates presented in Table 4 as well as state
effects and year effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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